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
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Facial Recognition Systems Operation Assurance: Lessons Learned in Investigative Searches

1 **1. Scope**

- 2 1.1 This is the final document in the FISWG Operational Assurance document series.
- 3 The reader must have a working knowledge of this document series.
- 4 1.2 The scope of this document is to provide a list of lessons learned when doing
- 5 investigative searches with facial imagery. This document will cover a wide range of
- 6 issues all of which can improve the overall operational performance of an operational
- 7 FRS deployment. This document is relevant to systems that operate with automated
- 8 workflows as well as investigative systems requiring a human practitioner to review a
- 9 candidate list.
- 1.3 An operational environment that performs investigative facial searching is not
- defined just by the assumed accuracy of the facial algorithm deployed in the biometric
- search core but needs to be defined by the overall support and attention to operational
- 13 details of the complete operational procedures utilized by the agency deployment.
- 14 Understanding how to ensure facial biometric accuracy is critical, but system
- 15 management issues and support for the human practitioners is equally important.

- 1.4 Topics outside of this document include but are not necessarily limited to proof-of-
- 17 concept pilots.
- 18 2. Referenced Documents
- 19 2.1 ASTM Standards¹:
- 20 E2916 Terminology for Digital and Multimedia Evidence Examination
- 21 E2825 Standard Guide for Forensic Digital Image Processing
- 22 2.2 Other Standards:
- 23 ANSI/NIST- ITL-1-2011 Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial &
- 24 Other Biometric Information²
- 25 **3. Terminology**
- 26 3.1 Definitions: See ASTM E2916 Terminology for digital and multimedia evidence
- examination terms.
- 3.1.1 *Doppelganger:* an apparition or double of a living person.
- 29 3.2 *Acronyms*:
- 30 3.2.1 CMC: Cumulative Match Characteristic
- 3.2.2 *DET*: Detection Error Tradeoff
- 32 3.2.3 *FR*: Face Recognition

¹ For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM Standards volume information, refer to the standard's Document Summary page on the ASTM website.

² ANSI/NIST-ITL Standard | NIST

- 33 3.2.4 FRS: Facial Recognition Systems
- 34 3.2.5 *FRVT*: Facial Recognition Vendor Tests
- 35 3.2.6 *GPU*: Graphics Processing Unit
- 36 3.2.7 *GUI*: Graphical User Interface
- 37 3.2.8 *IPD*: Interpupillary Distance
- 38 3.2.9 NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
- 39 3.2.10 *ROC*: Receiver Operating Characteristics
- 40 3.2.11 *ROI*: Return on investment

41 **4. Summary of Guide**


- 4.1 The document provides guidelines and techniques to help agencies that utilize
- 43 automated FRS understand and consider holistic approaches that can be referenced to
- improve overall biometric performance and improved identity management.
- 4.2 The intended audience of this document is system owners, system users, and
- system administrators of existing automated face recognition systems.
- 4.3 The document is a continuation of the FISWG documents:
- 48 4.3.1 "Understanding and Testing for Face Recognition Systems Operation
- 49 Assurance"
- 4.3.2 "Facial Recognition Systems Operation Assurance: Part 2, Identity Ground
- 51 Truth"

- 4.3.3 "Facial Recognition Systems Operation Assurance: Part 3, Image Quality
- 53 Assessment"
- 4.3.4 "Facial Recognition Systems Operation Assurance: Part 4, Manual Facial
- 55 Localization"

- 4.3.5 "Facial Recognition Systems Operation Assurance: Part 5, Scoring Thresholds"
- 4.4 The issues presented in this document form a foundation for other considerations
- and applications when testing such as system setup and tuning. This document builds
- on these engineering principles but expands upon them to cover other operational areas
- that should be addressed to achieve a higher level of operational effectiveness.

5. Significance and Use

- 5.1 An operational deployment is not represented by a DET chart extracted from a
- NIST FRVT publication. An operational FRS deployment should be the result of a
- rigorous test and evaluation process as well as addressing a wider range of issues that
- all can affect the overall investigative performance of the agency Mission. Figure 1
- 66 illustrates the operational interdependencies as data is input into the system and
- 67 practitioners finalize outcomes.



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Figure 1 – FRS Operational Interdependencies

70 **6. Topics**

- 71 6.1 Proper Testing
- 6.1.1 As per NIST recommendations, testing for an FRS deployment should be conducted with agency data and algorithms. NIST recommendations should be expanded upon to include agency workflows, agency examinations procedures, human practitioner impacts, and the threat context within the agency mission.
 - 6.1.2 Test data sets should have validated identity ground truth and properly replicate or represent operational gallery content and operational workflows.

78	6.1.3 Standardized test suites (i.e., test data set(s), select configuration(s), and test
79	specific workflow(s)) should be created that can be easily repeated in operational and
80	non-operational systems.
81	6.1.4 Test results and analysis should follow historical NIST testing:
82	FAR/FRR: Critical for mate/imposter threshold analysis
83	CMC: Critical for when evaluating identification rates and number of
84	candidates for human review analysis
85	DET: Overall performance for false accept/false reject
86	ROC: Overall performance for true accept/false accept
87	6.1.5 Test results and analysis should include demographic differential performance
88	if applicable to agency-specific mission criteria.
89	6.1.6 The two most critical workflow parameters that result from operational testing
90	are human review threshold score ranges and number of candidates. These should be
91	defined by the system owner and implemented by the system administrator. If these
92	aren't configured properly the results will include:
93	Missed identifications
94	Excessive human labor for little if any identification ROI
95	6.1.7 Understand algorithm limitations including:
96	File sizes: minimum and maximum

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• IPD: minimum and maximum

98	Pose effects: yaw, tilt, roll
99	Image rotation tolerances
100	Effects of:
101	 Excessive compression
102	Facial obstructions
103	Aspect ratio error
104	o Motion blur
105	Lightness and darkness limits
106	Score normalization issues:
107	○ Gallery size
108	Gallery dependent or gallery independent
109	 1:N versus 1:1 scoring differences
110	6.2 Data Management and Workflows
111	6.2.1 Data Awareness and Gallery Management
112	6.2.1.1 Unintended consequences in biometric accuracy assessments will occur if:
113	 Data is enrolled regardless of image quality and practitioner usability.
114	 It is assumed that post enrollment corrections and adjustments to operational
115	parameters and workflows can compensate for poor gallery management.
116	6.2.1.2 Vendor provided image quality metrics should be used to locate and possibly
117	isolate poor quality imagery for potential repair.
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118 6.2.1.3 Proper facial localization should be verified on all poses. If the face isn't 119 localized properly the image quality metrics are not valid. 120 6.2.1.4 Images that are unusable or incompatible with the facial algorithm, e.g., a left 121 or right profile image and an algorithm that is pose sensitive, should not be enrolled. 122 6.2.1.5 All FR algorithms have a low IPD limit where accuracy degrades quickly. 123 Know what this limit is from proper testing. 124 6.2.1.6 If available, extract soft biometrics (e.g., sex, race, age, facial hair, etc.) for 125 evaluation and potential usage. 126 6.2.1.7 Gallery content should be monitored. Image cleansing or repair should be 127 performed if needed. 6.2.1.8 Subsets of the gallery may perform differently and need special attention to 128 achieve desired accuracy levels. For example, images captured on film and transferred 129 130 to digital will perform differently than images captured natively in digital format. 131 6.2.1.9 Areas of high and low recidivism in candidate search results should be 132 identified. Excessive or improper manual image processing should be avoided as 133 current algorithms are highly tuned to compensate for wide ranges of image quality. Manual image processing techniques should align with agency policies and procedures 134 135 in addition to proper forensic principles.

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6.2.2 Operational Metrics

137	6.2.2.1 Data awareness, controlled gallery content, and test results provide
138	operational metrics that should be used to understand and adjust workflows with
139	confidence.
140	6.2.2.2 The overall configuration and workflows may require refinements as the facial
141	gallery expands.
142	6.2.2.3 Regardless of the galleries used for pre-deployment testing, once the system
143	is deployed, the leading edge of the imposter curve (i.e., FAR) will increase in score.
144	This may require adjustments to the human practitioner scoring thresholds.
145	6.2.3 Workflow Settings
146	6.2.3.1 Default search parameter settings should be derived from test results. The
147	following key search settings should be available for case-by-case manual overrides:
148	• Image quality thresholds, if used. Thresholds for enroll and search may be
149	different
150	Number of candidates returned from searches
151	Search filters, if used
152	Algorithm configuration parameters, if available
153	6.2.4 Exceptional Cases
154	6.2.4.1 Outliers, such as low score mates and high score imposters, should be used
155	to identify and mitigate operational gaps. These should be investigated to determine if

156	they are singular issues or indicative of broader systemic issues. For example, a higher
157	occurrence of twins in the operational gallery than was used for pre-deployment testing.
158	6.2.4.2 If contractual and classification issues allow consulting with the algorithm
159	provider may be warranted to mitigate operational gaps and address systemic issues.
160	6.2.4.3 Low score mate root causes include:
161	Improper facial localization
162	Poor image quality
163	Pose variations
164	Obstructions in the facial area
165	Other image quality issues
166	6.2.4.4 High score imposter root causes include:
167	Improper facial localization
168	Poor image quality
169	• Twins
170	• Siblings
171	• Doppelgangers
172	Other image quality issues
173	6.2.4.5 Using these exceptional cases can isolate gaps that could be closed or to
174	improve operational awareness to others like it.

175	6.2.4.6 Reporting and consulting with the algorithm provider should be considered if
176	contractual and classification issues allow this.
177	6.2.5 Search Filters
178	6.2.5.1 Filtering on sex, age, race, threat, behavior, location, etc. can be helpful
179	when doing investigative searching:
180	The candidates returned from the search will be of the context selected by the
181	practitioner
182	6.3 Practitioner Considerations
183	6.3.1 Human Practitioner Value
184	6.3.1.1 System owners should continuously poll their practitioners for feedback (e.g.,
185	improved efficiencies, process improvements, operational gaps, system defects,
186	suggested system changes, areas of concern, identified risks).
187	6.3.1.2 System owners should integrate this feedback into the strategic planning
188	process and system improvements and upgrades.
189	6.3.2 Human Practitioner Impacts
190	6.3.2.1 Operational lighting considerations that may impact human practitioners
191	include, but may not be limited to:
192	Ambient light temperature control: Warm light, cool light, white light
193	Ambient lighting variations that change by hour of day or time of year
194	IT equipment considerations that may impact human practitioners include:
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Searches

195	Multiple monitors should be provided
196	Monitors should meet photo-editing requirements:
197	o 99% Adobe sRGB color gamut
198	Embedded color calibration
199	Peak color accuracy
200	Optimized color calibration
201	o Hood
202	Monitor color calibration should be configured to a uniform standard after
203	polling practitioners
204	Monitor selection should be accompanied with appropriate video card
205	selection (e.g., embedded GPUs) that will sustain practitioner efficiency and
206	throughput, and enable future capability expansion.
207	System owners should be aware that monitors with too high a refresh rate,
208	too large screen size, etc. may negatively impact the practitioners.
209	6.3.2.2 GUI design to enhance image analysis:
210	GUI design should adhere to a "dark theme", if possible
211	Monitor background should be black
212	6.3.2.3 Eye strain:

- 213 • Frequent breaks should be taken when working on the computer to give 214 practitioners time to "re-calibrate" their brain/eyes³. 215 • Consideration of the 20-20-20 rule should be taken: every 20 minutes, look 216 20 ft away for 20 seconds. • Consider computer eyewear designed for the precise distance between the 217 218 eyes and the monitor, have anti-reflective coating, and a light tint 219 6.3.2.4 Practitioners should be assessed for color blindness, which is present in 7-220 8% of the human population. Agencies should evaluate if, and to what extent, color blindness affects their mission. 221 222 6.4 Facial Algorithms 223 6.4.1 Algorithm Provider 224 6.4.1.1 Operational support should be encouraged to ensure the product is functioning as advertised. 225
- 6.4.1.2 The relationships between FRVT tests and agency specific tests should be explained.
- 228 6.4.1.3 Contractual proposals should include technical support.
- 6.4.2 Algorithm Updates

³ <u>How Our Eyes See (kenrockwell.com)</u>

230	6.4.2.1 NIST FRVT testing should be followed and any upgrades should be planned
231	on a set schedule.
232	6.4.2.2 Algorithm updates or changes may affect the agency mission and workflows
233	and should be followed by proper testing and developmental updates.
234	6.4.3 Pose Invariant Algorithms
235	6.4.3.1 Deploying a pose invariant algorithm can have a dramatic impact on an FRS
236	if the facial images to be enrolled have variant poses.
237	6.4.3.2 There are many possible unintended consequences in going from an
238	algorithm that does not properly process high yaw imagery to an algorithm that does:
239	Facial localization may change
240	Image quality aspects may change
241	A larger gallery enrollment may occur
242	More computational resources may be needed
243	Changes to candidate lists may occur
244	6.5 Processes
245	6.5.1 Standards Groups
246	6.5.1.1 Participation in standards groups and reviewing of the documents produced
247	by them can be highly beneficial and should be encouraged. These groups include:
248	Facial Identification Scientific Working Group (FISWG): www.fiswg.org

249	 Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) for Forensic Science:
250	https://www.nist.gov/organization-scientific-area-committees-forensic-science
251	International Associations of Identification (IAI): www.theiai.org
252	European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI): www.enfsi.eu
253	Other collaboration groups
254	6.5.1.2 Human practitioner evaluations should be encouraged.
255	6.5.2 Developmental Considerations
256	6.5.2.1 Recent states in the US have passed legislation for any new FRS which
257	include:
258	Algorithms must have been tested and reported via NIST FRVT.
259	Accuracy testing mandates on agency data may follow.
260	6.5.2.2 Care should be taken to focus on iterative improvements while measuring
261	incremental ROI. Examples include:
262	Increase identifications and reduce misses by updating system
263	configuration(s) and/or changing workflows
264	Improve efficiencies, e.g., workflow process improvement
265	6.6 Key Takeaways
266	6.6.1 Considerations should be taken to optimize every step of the end-to-end
267	process.

268	6.6.2 An operational workflow for investigative facial searching should be
269	considered:
270	6.6.2.1 System: A facial image is received and is to be searched
271	6.6.2.2 Human: The image may be processed by a human practitioner before the
272	search
273	6.6.2.3 System: The image is searched and a candidate list returned
274	6.6.2.4 Human: The candidate list is reviewed
275	6.6.2.5 Human: Potential candidates may be located
276	6.6.2.6 Human: The search results are finalized and an investigative lead may result
277	6.6.3 If any of these sequential steps are minimized, the overall impact to the entire
278	process will be affected.
279	
280	
281	FISWG documents can be found at: www.fiswg.org